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Summary  findings
Pargal and Wheeler tcst a model of supply-demand  lower in poorer, less-educated  communities.  Thus, the
rclations in an implicit market for environmental  services  intensity  of pollution is far higher  in such communities.
when formal regulation is absent.  While it would be premature to generalize  from these
Thcy use plant-level  data from Indoncsia for 1989-90,  results, they suggest  that the model of optimal pollution
before the advent of nationwide environmental  control in environmental  economics is more relevant for
regulation. Treating pollution as a derived demand for  developing  countries than many have believed.
environmental  services,  their model relates  emissions of  Community-factory  interactions seem to reflect
biological  oxygen demand to the price (expected cost) of  environmental supply-demand  considerations  even  when
pollution; to prices of other inputs (labor, energy,  formal regulation  does not exist.
materials); and to enterprise characteristics  that may  In addition, the apparent power of informal regulation
affect pollution demand, including  scale, vintage,  implies that cost-effective  formal systems  should be
ownership,  and efficiency.  designed to complement,  not supplant, community
The price of pollution is determined by the  control. In particular:
intersection of plant-level  demand and a local  *  Local  communities  should not be forced to rely so
environmental  supply function, enforced by community  heavily on visibility  when judging environmental
pressure or informal regulation. Environmental supply is  performance. Formal regulation should include
affected by community income, education, the size of the  publication  of audited em.iissions  reports from factories.
exposed population, the local economic importance  of  *  Environmental  injustice may be real and important.
the plant, and its visibility  as a polluter.  Many poor, uneducated communities  may need extra
Their results are strongly consistent  with the existence  support from national regulators.
of an informal 'pollution equilibrium."  Pollution  *  However, appropriate regulation  should strike the
intensity  declines  witm  increases  in plant size,  efficiency,  t ight balance  between  equity and efficiency.  Uniform
and local materials prices. Older plants and publicly  national standards go too far because thev eliminate all
owned facilities  are more pollution-intensive;  the natural and legitimate  'egional diversity  that is also
multinational  ownership has oo independent effect.  reflected  in informal  arrangements.
The results  also suggest  that the price of pollution is
higher when plants are particularly  visible and is far
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This paper tests  a model of supply-demand  relations  in the implicit
market  for environmental  services  when formal  regulation  is absent.  We use
plant-level  data from Indonesia  for the  period  1989-90,  before  the advent  of
nationwide  formal  regulation. Treating  pollution  as a derived  demand  for
environmental  services,  we develop  an estimating  equation  which iB  like a
conventiorally-specified  input  dzemand  funcLion.  The dependent  variable  is
plant-level  discharge  of Biological  Oxygen  Demand,  a major water  pollutant.
Righthand  variables  include  the  price (expected  cost)  of pollution,  prices  of
other inputs (labor,  energy,  materials);  and enterprise  characteristics  which
may affect  pollution  demand,  including  scale,  vintage,  ownership,  and
efficiency.
In our model, the  expected  cost  of pollution  for factories  can  be
positive  without formal  regulation  because  of pressure (or  informal
regulation)  by neighboring  communities. Community  power and  preferences  are
revealed  in an environmental  supply  function  - the  schedule  of penalties  which
the firm expects the  conmunity  to impose  as pollution  increases.  Equilibrium
pollution  is determined  by the  intersection  of pollution  demand  and supply
schedules  at the factory  level.  The supply  schedule  is affected  by community
income,  education,  size  of the  exposed  population,  the local  economic
importance  of  the  plant,  and  its  visibility  as  a  polluter.  The  latter
variable  clearly  distinguisbes  formal  from informal  regulation;  when
regulators  do not  monitor  and report  emissions,  communities  must rely  on
visible  signs  of damaging activity.
our econometric  results  are strongly  consistent  with the existence  of an
informal  'pollution  equilibrium,  in Indonesia  before  national  regulation  was
instituted. The results  suggest  that:
*  Water  pollution  intensity  declines  significantly  with increases  in  plant
size,  efficiency  and visibility  to the local  community.
e  Production  is significantly  less  pollution-intensive  in areas  where
materials  prices  are  high; results  for  wages  and energy  prices  are in
the same direction  but  much weaker.
*  older  plants  and  publicly-owned  facilities  are more pollution  intensive.
Multinational  ownership  has  no independent  effect  on pollution
intensity.
*  Pollution intensity  is far  higher in poorer,  less-educated  communities.
Por the informal  regulation  hypothesis,  the last result  is  particularly
important:  Ceteris  paribus,  plants in Indonesian  kabupaten (municipalities)
with 25th-percentile  income  and  post-primary  schooling  are estimated  to have
water  pollution intensity  15 times the  prevailing  level in  kabupaten  with
75th-percentile  income  and education. An exploratory  analysis  of the  data
suggests  that  much of this disparity  may  be due to intercommunal  differences
in  power,  not preferences.
It would be premature  to generalize  from the  results  reported  in this
paper,  since  they are  based  on data for emissions  of one water  pollutant  in
one country.  However,  our  findings  are consistent  with the following
propositions:*  The model of optimal  pollution  control  in environmental  economics
provides  a more appropriate  paradigm  for  developing  countries  than  many
have believed.  Community-factory  interactions  seem to reflect
environmental  supply-demand  considerations  even  when formal  regulation
does not exist.
*  Policies  which favor  competition,  privatization  and elimination  of input
subsidies  should  significantly  reduce  the  water  pollution  intensity  of
manufacturing.
*  Rapid improvements  in cot,imunity  income  and education  will probably
significantly  lower  the  water  pollution  intensity  of manufacturing.
*  The apparent  power  of informal  regulation  implies  that cost-effective
formal  systems  should  ba designed  to complement,  not supplant,  community
control.  In particular:
*  Local communities  shouldn't  be forced  to rely so heavily  on
visibility  when judging  environmental  performance. Formal
regulation  should  include  publication  of audited  emissionR  reports
from factories.
*  'Environmental  injustice'  may be real and important. Many poor,
uneducated  communities  may need extra  support  from  national
regulators.
- However,  appropriate  regulation  should  strike  the  right balance
between equity  and  efficiency. National  uniform  :tandards  go too
far because  they eliminate  all the  natural  and legitimate  regional
diversity  which  is also reflected  in informal  arrAngements.
E-21. INTRODUCTION
Under formal  regulation,  the  government  acts as an agent for the
community in controlling  industrial  pollution.  In the  absence  of such an
institutional  agent,  a conventional  analysis  would assume  that  pollution is
costless  and essentially  unconstrained. However,  a growing  body of evidence
from Asia and Latin  America  suggests  that this is not the case.  In developing
countries  where formal  regulation  is weak or absent,  many communities  appear
to have struck  bargains  for  pollution  abatement  with local  factories.  We term
this phenomenon  'informal  regulation':  Acting in their  own self-interest,
communities  pursue  levels  of environmental  quality  which are  desirable  and
feasible  under  local conditions.
1.1  The economics  of  informal  regulation
in broad outline,  our  model  of informal  regulation  resembles  the
textbook  model  cf optimal  market-based  regulation.' Communities  have
implicit  property  rights  in the local  environment,  and  are willing  to make
their environmental  resources  available  to  polluters - but at escalating
prices (or  penalties)  as pollution  damage  rises.  Factories  find ways to
reduce  their  demand  for environmental  resources  as expected  penalties
increase. Equilibrium  arrangements  reflect  both demand-  and supply-side
considerations.
However,  our  model differs  from  the standard  model in its  assumptions
about monitoring,  regulatory  instruments  and enforcement. Communities  must
often strike  bargains  with poor information  about  plant-level  emissions  and
risks.  Without  recourse  to legal  enforcement  of existing  regulations  (if
any), they  must rely on the leverage  provided  by social  pressure  on workers
and  managers;  adverse  publicity;  the threat (or  use) of violence;  recourse  to
civil law; and  pressure  through  politicians,  local  administrators  or religious
leaders.
1.2 Ii'plications  for  environmental  policy
A  significant  role for informal  regulation  would  have several
implications  for environmental  policy  in  developing  countries. First,  it
would suggest  that the  model of optimal  pollution  control  in environmental
economics  provides  a more appropriate  paradigm  for developing  countries  than
many have believed.
Second,  widespread  informal  regulation  in a developing  country
represents  a promising  foundation  for  decentralized  regulatory  policy.  In the
1 See  Tietenberg (1992).textbook  paradigm  of environmental  economics,  optimal  pollution  loads  and
charges  should  vary across  communities  because  local  conditions  create
different  marginal  benefit  and cost schedules  for  abatement.  We would expect
this to be true of informal  regulation  as well.  New formal  regulatory  systems
may be able to build  on such local  arrangements  rather  than replacing  them at
unnecessarily  high cost.  The imposition  of "  national  system  of uniform
standards  might, in fact.  create  enough  deviation  from locally-optimal
standards  to reduce  welfare in some communities. 2
Third,  and probably  most important,  community  income  and  education  may
be very important  determinants  of informal  regulatory  outcomes. Communities
with low levels  of education  and information  may give inappropriately  low
weight  to pollution  simply  because  they  are  not aware of the consequences. 3
Factories  which  are large  local  employers  may receive  deferential  treatment
from  poor communities,  even if they are  heavy  polluters.  Finally,  communities
whose citizens  are  mostly  poor, poorly  educated  or members of marginalized
minority  groups  may  have little  ability  to  use the  available  channels  of
informal  regulation. Significance  for  these  factors  would establish  a clear
case of 'environmental  injustice.' To compensate,  formal  regulation  could  be
targeted  particularly  on pollution  control  problems  of poor communities.
1.3 Indonesia:  the test case
This paper tests  the informal  regulation  hypothesis  using  Indonesian
plant-level  data from several  surveys  conducted  in 1989 and 1990.  Indonesia
-provides  a good test  case.  It is large  and  highly  varied,  in both
environmental  and socioeconomic  dimensions. Indonesian  manufacturing  has  been
growing rapidly;  industrial  pollution  is clearly  a problem  and,  until  very
2  To illustrate,  suppose  that community  A has almost  no industry  (or
industrial  water  pollution)  and is located  next to a large,  swiftly-flowing
river  which rapidly  disperses  pollutants. Community  B is heavily
industrialized  and located  on a shallow  lake  which is easily  contaminated.
Under informal  regulation,  B may impose  much tougher  penalties  on newly-
arrived  polluters  than A.  But if national  regulators  impose  uniform
standards,  factories  will have  no incentive  to avoid B or move to A.  In fact,
agglomeration  economies  may well attract  them to B.  The result  could  be
higher  pollution  in  B than the  community  would  have accepted  under informal
regulation,  and much lower income/employment  in  A than the community  would
have desired.
It is also true,  of course,  that  poor information  and leverage  under
informal  regulation  might negate  this result. With national  enforcement  of
uniform  regulation,  conditions  in both communities  could  be worse-than-optimal
from the  perspective  of environmental  economics,  but better  than the  available
optimum  under informal  regulation.
3  It might  be argued  that  poorly  educated  or uninformed  communities  would
be more alarmist,  with consequent  assignment  of too  much weight  to pollution.
In developing  countries,  however,  the  opposite  seems  generally  true.
Uninformed  communities  have no basis for  judging  pollution  impacts  which  are
not visible  and immediate.  See  Huq/Wheeler  (1992)  for some illustrative  cases
from Bangladesh.
2recently,  most areas  have had little  or no formal  pollution  control.
Indonesia's  data collection  system  is also one of the  most efficient  and
comprehensive  in the  developing  woL.d,  permitting  the  construction  of the
broad  database  which has been  necessary  for this  exercise.
The paper is organized  as fo3lows.  Xn Section  2, we describe  our model
of informal  regulation. Section  3 specifies  an appropriate  regression
equation  and describes  the  data.  The results  and implications  are reported  in
Section  4, with a summary  and conclusions  presented  in Section  5.
2.  INDUSTRIAL  POLLUTION  UNDER XNFORXAL  REGULATION
our model of informal  regulation  follows  convention  in defining
emissions  as the use  of 'environmental  services'  - an additional  production
factor  in an augmented  KLEM (Capital,  Labor,  Energy,  Materials)  framework.
The implicit  'price,  of pollution  is the expected  penalty  or compensation
exacted  by the affected  community.  It is different  from other input  prices  in
two  ways.  First, it may  be plant-specific.  Optimizing  communities  may
tolerate  polluting factories  when they  provide  a lot  of jobs, local  contracts
or tax revenues.  Conversely,  they may  pay particular  attention  to plants
whose location  makes them  particularly  easy to monitor (e.g.,  large,  isolated
facilities)  or particularly  damaging  to the  local  environment  (e.g.  pulp mills
immediately  upstream from  local  fisheries  or irrigated  rice fields).
Secondly,  the price  of pollution  is an expectation,  not a certainty.
Plants  learn  about  expected  penalties  or  compensation  for  damage  by  observing
patterns  of  community  monitoring,  activism,  and  their  effects  on  other
factories.  Subsequent  abatement  decisions  reflect  the  attempt  to  minimize
total  costs, including  the  expected  cost of polluting  at different  levels.
2.1  Environmental  supply
Informal  regulation  reflects  local  factories'  acceptance  of  the
community's  property  right  in  the  environment.  Communities  use  their  leverage
to impose  penalties (costs)  on firms  whose emissions  are judged  unacceptable.
As factories  use up more local  environmental  quality,  affected  communities
will impose  higher  costs.  From the  viewpoint  of industry,  the result  is an
'environmental  supply  schedule',  which  shifts  inward  as average community
education  levels  and income  increase. Field  survey  evidence  from  Southeast
Asia suggests  that this schedule  will depend  on several  factors:  the level  of
community  organization,  information,  legal  or political  recourse,  media
coverage,  NGO presence,  the  efficiency  of existing  formal  regulation,  and the
3opportunity  cost  of time. 4 Many of these factors  are likely  to be
correlated  with community  income  and  education  levels.
2.2  Environmental  Damand
Faced  with a community-determined  environmental  supply  schedule,  each
plant  adjusts  pollution  to the optimal  point along its  pollution  demand
schedule,  derived from its  cost  minimization  exercise.S Thus,  potentially-
significant  determinants  of the environmental  demand  schedule  include:
* Output:  The KLEM framework  dictates  use of gross  output  value as the
appropriate  measure  for this study. Of course,  we expect  pollution  load to
grow with output,  ceteris  paribus. However,  most empirical  studies  of
relations  between  plant size and  pollution  abatement  have suggested  that scale
economies  in abatement  are the  general  rule.  Thus,  we would  expect  the
elasticity  of pollution  with respect  to output  to be significantly  less than
one.
e  Relative  input  prices:  Pollution  seems  likely  to be complementary  to
material  inputs,  but its  cross-price  relationships  with labor,  capital  and
energy  are not clearly  signed.
materials-intensive  production  also tends  to be pollution-intensive
because the  volume  of waste  residuals  is greater.  Thus,  an increase  in
material  prices  will encourage  substitution  toward  products  or
technologies  which  are less  materials-  and  pollution-intensive.
Zakor  has a much more complex  potential  relationship  with pollution.
Applied  econometric  work on KLEM  models  has often  suggested  that K/E and
L/M are complements  but that  the  pairs KE and LM are  gross substitutes  in
production.' If these  relations  hold,  an increase  in labor  price  will
lead to declines  in the  use of both labor  and  materials,  with a decline
in pollution  associated  with the latter. on the  other  hand, labor is
also an input  to pollution  abatement.  In this dimension,  an increased
wage should  lead to reduced  abatement  and higher  pollution. The ultimate
sign of the relationship  is therefore  ambiguous,  although  our  prior view
was that the  direct  production  effect (complementarity)  would dominate.
4  See  Huq/Wheeler (1992)  and  Hartman/Huq/Wheeler  (1994)  for  evidence  from
Indonesia,  Thailand,  Bangladesh  and India.
S  This is analogous  to a standard  input demand  function.
b  See Christenson,  et al. (1973).
4Capital  is  not  a consideration  for  this exercise,  since  we do not have
reliable  capital  stock  data.  We do not know  whether or not c:nital  is
complementary  to pollution  in  production. Abatement  equipment,  however,
is counted  as an addition  to the firm'9  capital  stock,  so we would assume
that this  would contribute  to a  positive  relationship  between  the  price
of capital  and  pollution (emissions).
Energy price increases  should  have  a positive  impact  on labor,  materials
(and  therefore  pollution)  if  energy  is a gross substitute  in production.
Energy  can also  be an important  input  to abatement,  with another  positive
cross-price  effect  on pollution.  In the  case of air pollution,  this
positive  effect  would  be attenuated  by the impact  of an energy  price
increase  on fuel combustion. The latter  is a major contributor  to
industrial  air emissions. Overall,  we might  expect  the  gross substitute
relation  to dominate  for  water  pollution  and the fuel  combustion  effect
to produce  overall  complementarity  for  air pollution.
* Sector:  Sectors  such as wood pulping  and steelmaking  have the  potential  to
generate  much higher  pollution  per unit  of output  than apparel  manufacturing
or electronics  assembly.  Abatement  itself  requires  factor  inputs  subject  to
diminishing  returns.  Cost-minimizing  firms  in  pollution-intensive  sectors
will therefore  have higher equilibrium  emissions  intensity,  whatever  the
implicit  price of pollution.
=  Vintage: Indonesia  is still  a heavy importer  of production  equipment  from
regulated  OECD economies,  where  pollution  control  has been increasingly
embodied  in new  process technologies.  In  addition,  installation  of end-of-pipe
abatement  equipment  during  plant construction  is cheaper  than retrofitting.
With rising  public  concern  over  pollution  in the 1980's,  we would  expect  this
cost factor  to dictate  a stronger  response  from new factories.  'Green
consciousness'  in some industrial  societies  may also drive their
internationally-oriented  construction  contractors  to pressure  Indonesian
clients  toward  greater  abatement. For  all these  reasons,  we would expect
newer  plants  to be cleaner.
* Efficiency: Well-managed  firms  should  be more capab]e  of responding  to
incentives  for  pollution  control.  They should  also be more profitable,  with
more discretionary  funds  available  to respond  to demands for  cleanup.
Finally,  such firms  should  generate  fewer  waste residuals  per  unit of output.
We would therefore  expect  more efficient  firms  to be cleaner.
* Ownership:  Almost  all multinational  firms  in Indonesia  are  headquartered  in
richer,  more regulated  economies  where 'green  consumerism'  is an important
factor  for  market  reputation. They also  have relatively  low-cost  access to
5clenn  technologies  developed  for the firms,  OECD plants.  Multinationals  may
also  be more sensitive  to their  public  image  in Indonesia. For  all these
reasons,  we might expect  multinationals  to be cleaner  than their  local
counterparts. 7 Public  plants  in Indonesia  are  quite  likely  to be older,  less
efficient,  and therefore  more pollution  intensive  than their  private
.ounterparts. After these  factors  are  accounted  for,  however,  the  residual
effect  of public  ownership  is not clear.  We might  expect  lower  pollution
intensity  for public  plants  operating  under  soft  budget  constraints,  because
they do not confront  the full  cost of abatement. However,  national
bureaucratic  control  may also shield  state-owned  facilitLes  from local
pressure.
2.3 The Quantity  and  Implicit  Price  of Pollution  in
Equilibrium
The following  equations  summarize  environmental  demand/supply  relations
under informal  regulation,  using the concept  of equilibrium  pollution  in an
implicit  'market  for  environmental  services.'  Expected  signs  of partial
derivatives  are  noted with the  variable  definitions  (?  denotes  uncertain
impacts  of opposing  effects,  as noted  in the  previous  discussion).
Demand:  The demand  for environmental  services  from the firm is  given
by:
(1)  Pii  =  f  (WPIJ,  WNj, Qi,  Al)
where
PlJ  =  Total  emissions  from  plant i in community  j
- =  Implicit  pollution  price for  plant i




+  =  Total  output  of plant i





?  public  ownership
Supply:  The environmental  supply  schedule  faced  by the  plant  reflects  the
expected  price it  will pay for  pollution  at each level.  This is modelled  as:
'  There is substantial  anecdotal  evidence  to support  this  proposition.
See for example  Birdsall/Wheeler  (1993). However,  a study  of abatement  by
pulping  mills in four  Southeast  Asian countries  by Hartman/Huq/Wheeler  (1994)
finds  no effect  of ownership  after  efficiency  is accounted  for.
6(2)  WPQ  f  (Put  C;,  Ell aj,  tl)
where
+  *P  Total emissions  from  plant i in community  j
C  A  vector  of community  characteriatics
+  income
+  post-primary  education
?  EO *  Share  of plant i in total  manufacturing  employmeni  in
community  j.  Measures  a plantls  economic  attractiveness  to
the community  (+),  as well as its  visibility (-).
?  a,  . Urbanization  proxied  by population  density.  Measures  plant
visibility C-)  as well as the size  of the affected
population  (+).
+  ti  . Total pollution  load faced  by community  j
Two variables  have opposing  signs in (2)  - Eu and  aJ.  Plants  which are  big
local employers  may be more valued,  but they are  also  more visible  as
polluters.  Urbanized  areas  have larger  affected  populations,  but the  presence
of many other factories  also makes it more difficult  to identify  polluters.
We  can solve for the firm's  equilibrium  pollution  as:
3  u  f(Wtj W,  W*  Q 1 i  s,,  v, f 1, ml,  g 1 , nl yju  aji  tJ,  ej)
Righthand  variables  for n  regression  equation  are  defined  as follows,  with
expected  signs  of estimated  parameters:
Standard  demand  variaajles
?  W 1j  Manufacturing  wage in community  J
?  W, - Energy  price index in community  J  (Water  +; Air  -)
- W  .Material  input  price index  in community  j
+  Q  =  Total output  of plant  i Co c  elasticity  c  1]
?  s. =  Sector of plant i
Firm-sDecific  variables
+  v, =Age  of plant i
- f,  = Factor  productivity  of plant i
- m}  =  Multinational  status of plant  i (I  if multinational)
?  g 1 =  Public/private  status  of  plant  i  (1  if  public)
Informal  regulation  variables
?  n,  =  Share of  plant  i in community  j's  manufacturing  employment
?  a,  =  Population  density  in  community  j
- yj  =  Per capita income in co;Jmunity  j
- ti  =  Current total pollution load in community j
- ej =  Post-primary  schooling rate in community j
72.4  The Roles  of  Sector  and  Location
As previously  mentioned,  broadly-defined  industry  sectors  differ  greatly
in average  pollution intensity  of production (see  Hettige,  et. al. (1994)).
However,  within-sector  variation  is also  very great,  and  process-based
variation  can be large even  within  sectors  defined  at very  high levels  of
disaggregation. Investors  make simultaneous  choices  of products,  processes,
abatement  levels  and production  location,  taking  relative  prices  at different
locations  into  account.  In  general,  we would  expect  pollution  per unit of
output  to be relatively  price-elastic.
2.4.1  Industrial  location  and  pollution
Plants  in areas with relatively  high implicit  pollution  prices should
have lower  pollution  per unit of output  for  two reasons.  First,  producers in
sectors  with high potential  pollution  intensity  will tend  to lower  costs  by
locating  elsewhere. Secondly,  plants  which  have other reasons  to locate  in
areas with high  pollution  prices  will lower  costs  by reducing  pollution.
Thus, we would expect  to observe  disproportionately  higher  survival  rates of
plants  which  are old, inefficient  and lower-abating  in  poorer,  less literate
areas  where it is "cheaper  to pollute".
The first  factor  explains  why an appropriate  plant-level  pollution
equation  fitted  to interregional  data does  not need to control  for industry
sector.  Nevertheless,  it is of interest  to know how much  variation in
pollution-intensity  is due to each of the  two factors:  Cross-sector  location
and within-sector  abatement.  This  exercise  will therefore  estimate  two
regression  models, with and without  sector  controls. The latter  will permit
an assessment  o; the impact  of righthand  variables )n  within-sector  abatement.
2.4.2  Possible  Endogeneity  of Income  and Education
Our  model employs  community  mean income  and education  levels  as
exogenous  variables.  To see  why this could  be wrong,  consider  the basic
contrast  in Pigouvian  and Coasian  interpretations  of the  externality  problem.
The Pigouvian  version  assumes  a static  system  of property  rights  in which
damage  from pollution  is unidirectional: A factory  locates  in a community,
and its  pollution  damages  local  health,  economic  activity  and ecosystems.
(Baumol,  1972).  In contrast,  a Coasian  view assumes  that the  externality  is
reciprocal: When polluting  factories  locate  in communities,  the damaged
parties  have the option  of moving  away.  Furthermore,  other  people  who were
formerly  unaffected  by the  pollution  may choose  to move in as property  values
fall  near the factory.  To claim  that  the factory  should  bear the full cost of
damaging  their  health  would,  of course,  be specious. In either  case,  the
b.sic policy  prescription  is clear:  Both polluter  aid  pollutee  should  bear
some of the abatement  cost  when  both are  mobile (Hartman,  1982).
8For  policy, the  relevance  of the two  perspectives  seems  context-
specific. When a pulp mill locates  upriver  from  a traditional  community  which
has never experienced  pollution,  the Pigouvian  perspective  seems  more
appropriate. In an urban area where all  agents  are mobile,  the Coasian
approach  has strong  appeal.
For econometric  analysis,  context  is also important.  Within  an urban
region  where residential  mobility  is comparable  to factory  mobility,  an
increase  in polluting  activity  in some subregions  will,  by the previous
reasoning,  induce  a decline in their  average  income  and education. Thus,  a
model which relates  pollution  to residential  income  in one urban  area is a
good target  for  Granger tests  of causality.
In our case,  however,  the argument  for  endogeneity  is far  less
compelling. The units  of analysis  are kabupaten  drawn from  a broad spectrum
of urban and rural  areas in Java,  Sumatra  and  Kalimantan.  Indonesia  exhibits
great spatial  variation  in community  cultures;  the  relative  social  and
economic  status  of kabupaten  has changed  little  since  1975.  During  that
period, however,  almost  all  of Indonesia's  manufacturing  has come into
existence.  Therefore,  in our case  industrial  location  dynamics  clearly
dominate  residential  location  dynamics. If there  is any  bias in our
estimates,  we are confident  that it is small.
2.5  Econ  otric  Specification
We have no strong  prior views  on appropriate  specification  of  the
estimating  equation  for equilibrium  pollution. The basic  pollution  demand
equation (P  =  f  (Wy,  W,,  Q)I could  be derived  along  with other input  demand
equations  from a  generalized  cost function  under the  assumption  of cost
minimization. The full demand  system  could  then  be estimated  using a translog
or Box-Cox  model.  At present,  however,  this degree  of rigor seems  premature
and inappropriate  for several  reasons.
First,  our theory  of informal  regulation  has not previously  been tested.
It would therefore  seem better  to start  with a relatively  simple  and tractable
empirical  exercise. Furthermore  Wp  is endogenous  and has many determinants.
There  are also many  plant-specific  demand-shift  variables in the  model.  Our
sample  is  not large,  and we know that measurement  errors  for the lefthand
variable,  while probably  normally  distributed,  are also quite  large in some
cases.  Nonlinear estimation  of a multi-equation  input  demand  system  simply
seems  too cumbersome  to be worthwhile  at this  point.  We therefore  confine
ourselves  to estimation  of log-log  regressions,  with dummies  for categorical
variables.
Heteroscedasticity  across  observations,  often  a problem  with cross
section  analyses,  was  not a significant  problem in our data.  We have,
however,  reported  White heteroscedasticity-consistent  results. AlthoughL  there
is fairly  significant  correlation  between  different  groups  of variables  in our
9dataset,  multicollinearity  does not appear  to have  been a problem  for
estimation.'
3. THE DATA
This study combines  Indonesian  manufacturing  and socioeconomic  census
data with observations  on plant-level  water  pollution  measured  as part of the
Environment  Ministry's  PROKASIH (Clean  Rivers)  Program  during  the period  1989-
1990.  Our plant-level  emissions  data have been  provided  by BAPEDAL,
Indonesia's  National  Pollution  Control  Agency  in the  Ministry  of Environment.
Data on plant characteristics  and socioeconomic  characteristics  of communities
have been provided  by BPS (Indonesia's  Central  Statistics  Bureau).  At
present,  BAPEDAL and  BPS do not assign  common  ID numbers  to factories. Thus,
creation  of the combined  dataset for  plants'  emissions  and other
characteristics  required  individual  matching  by name and location  from
separate  files  provided  by BAPEDAL  and  BPS.  Plant  location  information  in the
BPS file  was in turn  used to combine  the  plant-level  data with socioeconomic
variables for surrounding  sub-provincial  areas (kabupaten). In this  section,
we provide  a more detailed  discussion  of data sources  and quality.
3.1 The  Measure  of Water Pollution
For this study  we focus  on Biological  Oxygen  Demand (BOD),  the most
commonly-regulated  water  pollutant in both industrial  and developing
countries.  Biological  oxygen  demand is  associated  with oxidation  of organic
water pollutants  by naturally-occurring  micro-organisms.  This process removes
dissolved oxygen  from  the water  and can seriously  damage  some fish species
which have adapted  to the  natural  dissolved  oxygen  level.  Organic  water
pollutants  can also accelerate  the growth  of algae,  which will crowd  out other
plant species.  The eventual  death  and decomposition  of the algae is another
source  of oxygen  depletion  as well as noxious  smells  and unsightly  scum.  The
most common  measure for  BOD is the amount (kg)  of oxygen  used by micro-
organisms  to oxidize  the  organic  waste in a standard  sample  of pollutant
during  a five-day  period (hence  the standard  term '5-day  BOD').  We have used
the PROKASIH  5-day  BOD  measure to generate  daily  BOD load estimates.
PROKASIH  itself  was Indonesia's  first  nationwide  program for industrial
pollution control.9 For  this paper,  we employ  a cross-section  of benchmark
'  Parameter  signs  and magnitudes  were very stable  across  different  model
specifications,  and variance  inflation  factors  were not  unreasonably  high.
Exclusion  of single  variables  in correlated  sets from regressions  would,  of
course, increase  the estimated  effect  of the remaining  variables.
9  We are analyzing  its impact  on pollution  abatement  in a forthcoming
paper.
10BOD measures  taken  at the  beginning  of PROKASIH. They reflect  the
environmental  performance  of Indonesian  factories  before  the institution  of
nationwide  formal  regulation  of any kind.'" It was presumed  that the initial
BOD  data would be subject  to large  stochastic  reporting  errors  because  of
factory-level  inexperience  with appropriate  sampling  and measurement
techniques. However,  two large-sample  tests  of their  validity  by an outside
consultant  and the  Environment  Ministry  show that they  provide  unbiased,
robust  estimates."1  We expect  the  sampling  errors  to generate  relatively
high 'unexplainable'  variance  in the  data set,  but tests  of significance
should  not otherwise  be affected.
3.2  Plant Characteristics
our data on plant characteristics  are drawn  from the  Annual  Census  of
Manufactures  administered  by BPS.  This detailed  census  has  been administered
by BPS since 1975,  and  has been subjected  to frequent  and  rigorous  checks.  It
is generally  considered  to be one  of the  most reliable  manufacturing  datasets
available  for  a developing  country.
Standard  census  data have been used for our  measures  of total  output
value,  age,  and  local  employment  share  for  the  PROKASIH  plants.  The  latter
variable  is  constructed  by  calculating  total  kabupaten  manufacturing
employment  from  the  census  and  dividing  plant-level  employment  by  this  total.
Because  we  do  not  have  sufficient  data  for  an  estimate  of total factor
productivity,  we  have  used  reported  value  added  per  production  employee  as  our
proxy.' 2 The  census  data  also  include  information  on  the  proportion  of  firm
equity  held  by  foreigners;  the  proportion  of  equity  held  by  the  regional  and
central  governments,  which  we  have  combined  to  get  a  measure  of  public
ownership;  and  sector  identification  - used  to  create  the  following  ISIC"3
10  Prior  to  PROKASIH,  some  local  governments  took  measures  against  water
pollution  in  response  to crisis  situations. Most notably,  the  Governor  of
East  Java  forced  several  large  factories  to install  abatement  equipment  in
1987,  when  pollution  of  the  Brantas  River  became  extremely  high  during  the  dry
season.
11  The  problem of bias is unusual  in this context. Ordinarily,  self-
reported  data  on pollution  would  be suspected  of downward  bias.  However,
PROKASIE is  a  voluntary  program  with  no  formal  sanctions  for  noncompliance
with  pollution  reduction  agreements. Plants  which are  committed  to pollution
reduction  in  a  sanctionless  program  have  an  incentive  to  overestimate  their
pollution  in the first  period.  In  any case,  the  validity  checks  show that the
PROKASIH  estimates  exhibit  neither  upward  nor downward  bias.  See Afsah (1994)
for a detailed  discussion  of estimation  problems  in the  PROKASIH  data.
12  We calculated  profits  for each  plant as [value  added - total wage bill
- interest (capital  cost)]  from the  manufacturing  census  data for 1989.  The
correlation  between  value added  per  production  employee  and  profit  per
production  employee  was positive  and  significant. Our  variable  may therefore
be a reasonable  proxy for  productivity.
13 ISIC refers  to International  Standard  Industrial  Classification  codes.
11sector  dummies:  food  products (ISIC  3121),  spinning  and weaving  textiles
(3211),  tanneries  and leather  finishing  (3231),  sawmills  and  wood mills (3311)
and pulp,  paper and  paperboard (3411).
3.3 Input  prices
For this study,  we have been able to generate  kabupaten-level  price
estimates  for labor  and energy. Materials  price differences  are proxied  with
a very crude locational  dummy  variable.
Kabupaten  manufacturing  wage: We have computed  this from 1989 census  data as
the  mean plant-level  wage for  production  workers  across  all census  plants
(manufacturing  plants  employing  more than 20  people) in the  kabupaten.  The
plant-level  estimates  were obtained  by dividing  total  wages and salaries  paid
to production  employees  by the total  number  of production  employees.
Materials  price:  We have no direct  measure  of relative  materials  prices  by
sector.  We use a Java location  dummy  to proxy transport  cost considerations
for heavy  materials  in  pollution-intensive  sectors. Higher  prices  at the
factory  gate should  induce  materials-saving  and  pollution  reduction.  Factories
on Java  now import  much of their  heavy  materials  from other islands,  thus
facing  relatively  higher  transport-related  costs.  Higher  materials  costs
should  reduce  materials-  and  pollution-intensity.  A  second,  possibly
important  factor  has to do with social  and political  power.  In Indonesia,  this
still  resides  disproportionately  in Java.  Thus,  Javanese  kabupaten  may
collectively  exert  more influence  on environmental  performance  than those  on
other islands.
Energy  price:  We have computed  a single  fuel  price index for  energy,  using
plant-level  data from the 1989 manufacturing  census.  It is a weighted  average
of prices (per  million  BTU) for electricity,  gasoline,  high speed  diesel
oil(HSDO),  diesel,  kerosene,  natural  gas, coke  and coal for  each kabupaten.
The  weights  are  national  energy  expenditure  shares  for  each  fuel.14
3.4  Community  Characteristics
Our  estimates  for  per  capita  expenditure,  post-primary  education  and
population  density  are  drawn from the  SUSENAS  surveys conducted  by BPS in 1988
and 1990.  Per  caDita  household  expenditure  was nudged  to be the  most reliable
14  Using 1989 manufacturing  census  data,  we have separately  computed
prices for electricity  and a fossil  fuel index  for each kabupaten. This index
is a national  purchase-share-weighted  average  of prices (per  million  BTU) for
gasoline,  USDO,  diesel, kerosene,  natural  gas, coke and coal.  Since  the t'-o
kabupaten  indices  turned  out  to  be  highly  correlated,  we  decided  to use a
single  fuel  price index.
12available  measure  of living  standards,  and  was  used to proxy per capita
income.
3.5  Data Description
Out of a total  sample  of 253  plants,  we have exact  ownership  information
on 246  plants: of these  3  are wholly foreign-owned  and  over 50 have some
foreign  participation;  13 are comple.ely  owned  by the  government  and 178  are
private domestic  firms.  Factory  age ranges  from 0  years (2  firms)  to 90 years
(2  firms),  with the median  age of firms  being 10 years.  The geographic  spread
of the  data is restricted  to three islands  - Java (189  firms),  Sumatra (40
firms),  and Kalimantan (24  firms)  - and 8  provinces.  Forty one ISIC  codes  or
sectors  are represented  in the  dataset  and firms  range in size from 22 to
41,821 employees,  with share  in kabupaten  employment  varying  from 0.02%  to
91%.  The kabupaten  represented  in the  data are quite  varied  as well: 1990
population  density  ranges  from 3.4 to 53,876  persons  per square  km., the
proportion  of the  population  with more than  a primary  education  varies  between
6.85% and 48.5%,  and mean annual  per capita  expenditure  varies from  Rp.
256,447  to Rp. 837,277 (1990  Rp.).
Mean per capita  expenditure,  population  density (the  urbanization
proxy), and the proportion  of the kabupaten  with more than a primary  education
are significantly  positively  correlated  in the  raw data.  As expected,  the
locational  dummy for  Java is positively  correlated  with mean per capita
expenditure  and population  density  but negatively  associated  with the
proportion  of the population  with higher  than  primary schooling. Mean
manufacturing  wage in the  kabupaten  is positively  related to the average  fuel
price in the  kabupaten.
4. RESULTS
Table 1 presents  the  results  for  pollution  regressions  estimated  with
and without sector  controls. They are strongly  consistent  with our  basic
thesis:  Without  any formal  regulation,  equilibrium  emissions  can  still  vary
strongly  across  firms  and regions  in response  to differences  in scale,
regional  input  prices, f'rm  characteristics,  and the  degree  of informal
regulation  by local  communities. Parameter  signs  and standard  error  estimates
are mostly stable  across  Models  I and II.
The obser-ed  pollution  intensity  of production  at a particular  plant is
the outcome  of several  decisions:  the choice  of location,  product,  process
technology  and end-of-pipe  abatement.  Model I  depicts  the end result  of  all
these choices.  Locational  and investment  decisions (the  choice  of sector,
site, and technology)  respond  to relative  prices, including  that  of pollution
- across  space,  sectors,  and  prodution  processes. The degree  of end-of-pipe
13abatement is also a response to pollution and other input prices at the
production site.  As previously noted, sector dummies in Model II separate the
effects of these decisions by controlling for prior choice of location at the
sectoral level.  Model II depicts the within-sector factoro that influence
abatement - and thus emissions.  Predictably, the use of sector controls
reduces estimated elasticities for the five locational variables: wages, fuel
prices, population density, post-primary education and per capita income
(although  the latter remains highly significant in either model).  It is clear
that significant variation in the observed level of pollution emissions is
explained by the choice of technology and sector.  Although we present the
results of both model specifications in Table 1, our interpretation of  the
results is based on Model I since it incorporates both the locational and the
abatement response.  One-tail tests would be appropriate for tests of
significance for most parameters (exceptions are energy price, firm employment
share and population density,  whose net effects could be either negative or
positive).  However, Table 1 applies two-tail tests to provide the most
conservative measures.
4.1 Standard Demand Variables
As expected, the estimated output elasticity of water pollution is
significantly less than one: Pollution intensity declines with scale.
specifically, the pollution intensity of production decreases by 0.35% for
each  percent  increase  in  output.  The  wage  results  suggests  complementarity  of
labor  and  water  pollution.  However,  the  high  estimated  wage  elasticity  has  a
high  standard  error,  so  we  could  not  reject  hypotheses  of  zero  or  positive
elasticities at any elevated confidence level.' 5 Part of this result
undoubtedly reflects straight substitution effects.  Higher wages may also
reflect higher levels of technical skills on the part of the local workforce,
which might lead to "within" firm efforts to produce more efficiently and
cleanly.1 6 Model II suggests  that much of the wage effect comes through
location, not local abatement.
Estimated energy price elasticities are negative and large, but standard
errors  are  again  so  high  that  we  cannot  reject  hypotheses  of  zero  or  positive
elasticity  at  any elevated  confidence  level.  The  effect  of  location  on  Java
is as expected:  Large, negative and highly significant. As previously noted,
we have used this as a crude proxy for relative materials prices.  There may
also be some reflection of political power here, although we have introduced
separate controls for community income and education.
15 Spatial autocorrelation is a possible explanation for the low levels of
significance of some variables.  However, the fact that the data cover plants
clong different rivers in widely separated regions makes us discount
this possibility.
16  We are indebted to Mainul Hug for this point.
14TADLE  1:  REGRESSION  RES8ULS
Dependent  variables  Log  DOD load
|  N=250  ti  odel I [Adj  R
2=0.3146]  Model  II  (Adi  R=0.3805]
Variable  Coefficient  t  stat.  Coefficient  t  stat.
.Btim.at.  I  EstiaStab
XNTERCEPT  31.580  (6.76)  4.67**  17.479  (7.32)  2.39**
DEHAND  VARIABLES  I  11
Log [OUTPUT]  0.647  (0.19)  3.34**  0.712  (0.19)  3.78**
Log (WAGE]  -0.740  (0.62)  -1.20  -0.316  (0.61)  -0.52
Log (FUEL  PRICE)  -2.257  (2.42)  -0.93  -1.267  (2.44)  -0.52
D[JAVA]  -1.231  (0.55)  -2.23*  -1.530  (0.51)  -2.98**
FIRM  VARIABLES 
Log (VA/WORKER)  -0.325  (0.18)  -1.81*  -0.312  (0.17)  -1.79*
Log (AGE]  0.273  (0.17)  1.64  0.179  (0.17)  1.07
FOREIGN-  -0.002  (0.01)  -0.27  0.0004  (0.01)  0.06
OWNERSHIP  I
STATE OWNERSHIP  0.017  (0.01)  2.64**  0.021  (0.01)  2.91**
XNFORMAL REGULATION  _  1
Log (LOCAL EMPL.  -0.352  (0.18)  -1.94*  -0.313  (0.17)  -1.84*
Log (INCOME PER  -4.021  (0.91)  -4.41**  -2.811  (0.93)  -3.02**
Log (% GT PRIMARY]  -1.072  (0.57)  -1.87*  -0.668  (0.57)  -1.17
Log (POP. DENSITY]  0.344  (0.17)  2.04*  0.128  (0.21)  0.62
D  [TEXTILES]  I  1.247  (0.37)  3.41**
D (LEATHER TANNING]  )  1.961  (0.63)  3.12**
|D  FOOD]  I  1  2.480  (0.55)  4.52**
D [PULP,  PAPER]  _  _  2.265  (0.57)  3.98**
D (WOOD PRODUCTS]  _  -0.930  (0.92)  -1.02
b  White heteroscedasticity consistent otandard errors in parentheBes
*  E6:0- 0  rejected with 90% confidence {two-tail)
**  E:p  =  0 rejected with 99% confidence (two-tail)
154.2 Firm-Specific Factors
Our results suggest that firm and plant characteristics have a strong
impact on pollution intensity.  More efficient plants are cleaner, as
hypothesized; oluer plants are dirtier, but the latter effect is neither as
large nor as significant as we would have supposed a priori.  Pollution
intensity changes by about .3% in response to each 1% change in efficiency.
After controlling for scale, age and efficiency, foreign participation doesn't
appear to have a significant effect on pollution intensity.  This confounds
the prior hypothesis, and suggests strongly that the anecdotal evidence hae
failed  to  distinguish  foreign  ownership  from  plant  characteristics.
Such  factors  are,  in  fact,  significantly  associated  with  variations  in
ownership.  We have studied these relationships using the proportion of equity
held by foreigners as well as the proportion of firm equity held by the
government in a separate analysis based on the entire 1989 Census of
Manufactures.1 7 The results were confirmatory in some ways, and surprising in
others.  Plants owned by firms with greater equity held by foreigners OR the
government are older, bigger, higher in value added per worker, and higher in
share  of  kabupaten  manufacturing  employment.  Three  out  of  four  characteristics
are negatively associated with pollution intensity in the regression renults.
The residual effects (measured  by the parameters for public and foreign
ownership shares) are neutral for foreign status and significantly positive
for public enterprises.
Thus, anecdotes about  'clean'  multinationals may well have confused
'outsider' status with the effects of size and efficiency.  Our results
suggest that big, efficient domestic firms are not significantly more
pollution-intensive than their multinational counterparts.  Public
enterprises, on the other hand, present a mixed picture.  Their
characteristics  (except age) imply relatively clean operation, but the pure
'public' effect is extremely dirty.  Thus, the posited  'shielding' effect
seems to outweigh any leverage from soft budgets.
4.3 Informal Regulation Variables
Our results for community income and education are strongly consietent
with  the  informal  regulation  hypothesis.  The  estimated  income  elasticity  of
pollution  reduction  is  highly  significant  and  extremely  large:  Pollution
intensity declines 4% with each 1% increase in community income.  Given a
threefold range in sample community incomes, this implies a major impact.
Income and education are obviously related: the sample correlation is 0.67.
Nevertheless, education has a separate and significant impact in Model I:
17  We used the following regression: ln Y =  ab  +  a,F  +  a2P,  where Y
represents the various dimensions of interest (vintage, scale of output etc.),
F refers to the proportion of equity held by foreigners and P to the
proportion owned by the state and central government.
16Pollution intenesity  declines 1% with each 1% increase in community  share of
residento with greater than primary education.  Given the oevenfold range of
variation in the sample, the results also suggest a  major, separate impact for
community education.
The results for plants' local employment share and population densLty
reflect the net impact of two forces.  Plants which are bigger local employers
might get laxer treatment on pollution, and more populous areas will have more
people affected by pollutLon.  These considerations would imply a positive
impact on pollution for employment status and a negative impact for population
density.1" On the other hand, bigger plants attract more attention, and
pollution from plants in crowded urban areas is harder to trace to the
source. 1 9 These 'visibility' considerations would imply a negative impact on
pollution for employment status and a positive impact for population density.
In this case, the visibility effect seems clearly dominant.  Both
results are consistent with the second interpretation above: Plants with
higher local employment shares have lower pollution intensities, ceterie
paribus;  plants in more densely-populated areas are more pollution intensive.
4.4 Summary Assessment of the Results
To  summarize our results, plant-level water pollution intensity  (DOD
load  per  unit  value  of  output)  is  significantly  lower  in  firms  which  are
larger,  more  efficient,  higher  in  local  employment  share,  and  confronted  with
higher  local  wages  and  materials  costs.  Pollution  intensity  is  higher  in
older, publicly-owned firms.  It is  also  higher  in  kabupaten  which  are  more
urbanized, poorer and less-educated.
What  has  been  the  relative  impact  of  these  variables  on  the
environmental  performance  of  Indonesian  factories  in  the  absence  of  formal
regulation?  We  can  answer  this  question  by  simulating  the  comparative  impact
of  key  firm  and  community  characteristics.  From  the  sample,  we  have
determined  first  and  third  quartile  values  for  factory  age;  factory  value-
added  per  worker;  comunity  per  capita  income;  and  community  proportion  with
greater  than  primary  education.  Holding  other  regression  variables  at  their
mean  values,  we  then  calculate  pollution  intensities  along  three  dimensions:
plant  age/efficiency  (75th  percentile  plant  age  and  value  added  per  worker  vs.
25th percentile values]; ownership (foreign participation; public
participation; private domestic]; and  informal  regulation  [75th  percentile
community  income  and  education  vs.  25th  percentile  values].  The  results,
displayed  graphically  in  Figure  1,  show  striking  differences:
19  We  should  note  that  the  employment  effect  is  reciprocal:  a.  large  plant
will  be  very  dependent  on  the  community  for  employees,  and  this  may  mitigate
its  bargaining  power.
"'  For  supporting  survey  evidence  see  Huq/Wheeler  (1992)  and  Hartman/Huq/
Wheeler  (1994).
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orgn  pubic  pS  0000*  Plant characteristicat  An old,  unproductive  plant  (75th  percentile  on  age;
25th percentile  on value added  per worker)  is about 2.4  tises  oore  water
pollution  intensive  than  a young and  productive  firm (25th  percentile  on
age; 75th percentile  on  value  added  per  worker).
*  Ownership:  Public enterprises  are  about  5.4  times  mors  water  pollution
intensiva  than  plants  owned  by  private  domestic  firms.  The  results  suggcet
that multinationals  are somewhat  less  pollution-intensive  than private
domestic  firm,,  but all estimates  fail  to pass reasonable  significance
testu.
*  Informal  regulation:  Plants  in  poor, less  educated  areas  (25th  percentile
on  income  and  education)  are  about  15  4  times  more  water  pollution
intensive  than  plants  in  relatively  affluent,  well-educated  (75th
percentile)  areas.
5  SUDOARY  AND IKPLICArIONS
Econometric  work  on  determinants  of  pollution  intensity  at  the  plant  level
is scarce  even in  the OECD economies. As far  as we know,  this is the first
such study for  a developing  country. Our results suggest  that, even in the
absence  of any formal  regulation,  factory-level  water pollution  intensity  in
Indonesia  has  been highly  responsive  to many variables  which  can be affected
by  non-environmental  policies.
5.1  Future  Pollution  Without  Forzal  Regulation
For several  major  determinants  of pollution  intensity,  recent  trends in
Indonesia  are  extremely  hopeful.  To begin  with a simple  but powerful
consideration,  there  will be no more 'old'  factories.  Our results  indicate
that new facilities  are cleaner  than average  existing  plants.  Similarly,
there are not likely  to be any  new state  enterprises  in the industrial  sectow.
Deregulation  and enhanced  competition  during  the  1980's  have  also  presumably
increased  plant-level  efficiency  in  the  private  sector.  Post-primary
education,  industrial  wages  and  per  capita  income  are  advancing  steadily
throughout  Indonesia.
If  cross-section  results  can  be  extrapolated  to  time  series,  these  trend.
should  be  associated  with  an  extremely  large  drop  in  the  average  pollution
intensity  of  Indonesian  manufacturing,  no  matter  what  happen.  in  the  formal
regulatory  sector.  Furthermore,  the  predicted  effect  does  not  depend  on  any
increased  presence  of  foreign,  putatively  'green,  firms  in  Indonesia.  more
multinationals  will certainly  come,  but our evidence  suggests  that their
environmental  performance  will be matched  by  domestic  firms  which are
otherwise-comparable.
Of  course,  the  basic  question  remains:  Can  we  credibly  extrapolate  from  the
cross-section  results?  We see  no  problem.  for changes  in  plants'  age,
18efficiency  and ownership.  However,  the extremely  powerful  cross-section
result  for kabupaten  income  and  education  may seem suspect.  As previously
noted,  we are not  particularly  worried  about  estimation  bias frim joint
determinatlon  in  pollution  intensity  and income/education  levels.  Indoneoian
manufacturing  has  emerged  very quickly,  while  cross-kabupaten  socioeconomic
rankings  have been relatively  stable.m
However,  the problem  of 'sorting'  must still  be considered.  Suppose  that
all plants  have fixed  pollutlon intensity  and locate  so  as to minimize  total
expected  costs.  Then 'dirty'  plants  will  move to poor communities  which
cannot  effectively  resist;  clean  plants  will locate  in rich communities.
Income  growth in  poor communities  will not change  this 'sorting'  as long an
the distribution  of income  doesn't  change  oignificantly.21  Rich communities
will still  have higher  preference  for  environmental  quality and  more power to
enforce  their preferences.
If 'sorting,  were the dominant  factor,  we would  have to be much loss
sanguine  about  the  potential  impact  of  changes  in  income  and education  on
pollution  intensity. However,  as we have  previously  noted,  pollution  in all
industry  sectors  is highly  elastic  to choices  of products,  proceses,
materials  use rates  and end-of-pipe  abatement. In our view, the result  is
therefore  explained  more  by  adjustment  than  sorting.  However,  a  more
definitive  answer  will only be possible  once  we have appropriate  time series
data.
5.2  Preferences  or Power?
Our results suggest  that pollution  intensity  is much greater in poor
communities  because  of disparities  in  preferences  and power.  How much is
attributable  to  each?  We can  draw  some  suggestive  evidence  from  the
distribution  of  pollution  intensities  in  poor  areas.  Low-income  communities
with relatively  low  pollution  intensities  may well have greater leverage
because  they have cohesive  ethnic  or religious  groups,  particularly  gifted
community  leaders,  national  NGO chapters,  etc.  These outlier  communitles  have
more power,  but their income-based  preferences  should  be similar  to those  of
other poor communities.
We explore  the potential  importance  of power  by examining  the intensity
variation  of communities  in the poorest  quintile  vs. the variation  In  mean
intensity  between  the poorest  and richest  quintiles. We control  for firm
characteristics  and 'visibility'  factors  in a preliminary  regression.
X  Casual  empiricism  suggests  that in Indonesia  the wealthy  do not  move;
the  movement  of the  poor is  towards jobs in  urban/industrial  areas,  leaving
behind  the relatively  poorer  agricultural  hinterland. This would tend to
attenuate  the observed  disparity  in pollution  intensity  across  rich and  poor
areas.  Likewise,  differential  location  of  polluting  firms  in  poorer  areas
would  again  reflect  the  power  of  the  rich  to  translate  their  preferences  into
desired  environmental  quality.
a  We are  indebted  to  Martin  Ravallion  for  this point.Figure  2
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Per capita expinditure quintilesResiduals  are  then sorted  by income  quintilo  medians  and  quartiles  are
dieplayed  by community  income  group  in Figure  2.  The result  suggest.  a  strong
role for  power;  the  difference  between  the first  and third  quartiles  for  poor
communLties  is larger  than the difference between medians for the poorest and
richest  communities. The "best  off"  poor  communities  appear  to be much  better
off  than  the "worst  off"  rich communitieo. It seeme  reasonable  to lnfer  that
the estimated  income  elasticity  of -4 in  Model I reflects  a sizable  measure  of
power as  well ao preferences. If  this is true,  the national  regulatory  agency
could  play a useful  equalizing  role.
5.3  Formal  vs. Informal  Regulation
How does  the  informal  pollution  equilibrium  in  Indoneeia  compare  with
probable  conditions  under  formal  regulatLon?  A  formal  system  might  well  have
the  edge  in  priority-setting,  monitoring  and  enforcement.  National  regulatory
agencies  generally  have  technical  staff  members  who can  do scientific  risk
assessment. They can impose  uniform  reporting  requirements  on factories  and
use  national  government  power  to  enforce  the  rules.  However,  national
agencies  have  revealed  a  strong  bias  toward  uniform  standard-setting,  even  in
countries  with  great  variations  in  geography  and  levels  of industry
concentration.  In  addition,  new  regulatory  instltutions  in  many  developing
countries  are  still  quite  weak  in  technical  risk  assessment,  data  collection
and  consistent  enforcement.
The  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  informal  regulation  present  an  interee  .- g
contrast.  As  we  have  noted,  poor  communities  may  have  few  avenues  of  self-
defense.  In  addition,  our  results  are  consistent  with  the  'visibility'
hypothesis: Knowing  little  about  long-term  risks,  local  communities  will tend
to focus  on visible  pollution  whose  impact  is immediate  and  obvious.
monitoring  may focus  on plants  which  are  easy  to observe  rather  than  those
which should  be observed. Our results  on population  density  suggest  such  a
problem:  Plants  which  are  hidden  in large,  polluted  complexes  may face less
monitoring  than  plants  in  rural  areas  with  few  pollution  problems.
However,  informal  regulation  also  has  clear  advantages  over rigid  formal
systems.  Local  communities  often  have  a  different  perception  of  regulatory
benefits  and  costs  than  national  agencies.  They  may  also  have  a  more  accurate
sense  of local  pollution  problems  than new  agencies  whose  monitoring
capabilities  are  weak.  Thus,  informal  regulation  may  yield  a  pattern  of  local
environmental  shadow  prices  superior  to  the  pattern  realistically  achievable
under  formal  regulation.
Since  each  system  has clear  advantages  and  disadvantages,  we strongly
suspect  that  the  optimal  system  would  be a  hybrid  one.  In  such  a  system,  the
national  agency  might  concentrate  its  resources  on  monitoring,  inspection,
resk  analysis  and  dissemination  of  information  to  local  communitLes.  Local
20communities  could  be empowered  to mat  their  own standard.,  using  the national
agency  for legal  nupport  and  enforement where necessary.
Given  the preliminary  nature  of this  work, it would  be premature  to push
thees ideas  too forcefully. Nevertheless,  our  results  are consistent  with the
existence  of a strong  informal  regulatory  oystem  in Xndonesia. If that in the
case,  Indonesia  may  well want to incorporate  the best features  of this eystem
into  national  regulatory  policy.
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